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A total of 1,068 asymptomatic close contacts of
patients with severe acute respiratory (SARS) from the
2003 epidemic in Hong Kong were serologically tested, and
2 (0.19%) were positive for SARS coronavirus immuno-
globulin G antibody. SARS rarely manifests as a subclinical
infection, and at present, wild animal species are the only
important natural reservoirs of the virus.
S
ince severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and
the coronavirus (SARS-CoV) that causes it have
emerged and spread, considerable progress has been made
in understanding the biology, pathogenesis, and epidemio-
logic features of both the virus and the disease.
Epidemiologic studies of hospitalized patients suggest that
the overall transmissibility of SARS (as indicated by the
basic reproductive number R0 = 2.7, 95% confidence inter-
val [CI] 2.2–3.7) (1) is relatively low compared to other
pathogens. However, such studies could not take into
account possible episodes of mild or moderate illness that
did not require inpatient medical care and could not
address whether asymptomatic community spread played a
role in the 2003 epidemic. If this type of spread occurred,
sufficient herd immunity against SARS-CoV to protect
against another large-scale outbreak might have been
developed in the population. The full spectrum of disease
associated with SARS-CoV infection should be examined
to define more precisely what constitutes a case requiring
quarantine and isolation to minimize potential human-to-
human spread. Understanding these issues requires the
systematic study of the seroprevalence of SARS-CoV anti-
body in a large sample stratified by age and other baseline
characteristics, especially since children were dispropor-
tionately less affected by SARS, both in terms of reduced
incidence and severity of infection. Serologic surveys can
be based on a random sample from the total population
with appropriate stratification, on serum collected for other
reasons (e.g., blood donors, all hospital admissions), or on
surveys of persons who resided in sites of superspreading
events or who have had close contact with a confirmed
SARS patient. 
We report a serologic survey for immunoglobulin (Ig)
G against SARS-CoV in a representative sample of close
contacts of all SARS patients in Hong Kong (>76% had
laboratory confirmation of SARS by either paired serology
or repeat reverse transcription–polymerase chain reaction
(RT-PCR) according to World Health Organization [WHO]
criteria [2]). 
The Study
During the epidemic, close contacts were prospectively
identified by the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region Government Department of Health through stan-
dardized telephone interviews with all 1,755 confirmed
SARS patients within 1 week of hospital admission
(February 15–June 22, 2003). A close contact was defined
as a person who had cared for, lived with (in the same
household), or came into direct contact with body fluids of
the SARS patients within 10 days before hospital admis-
sion. A total of 3,612 close contacts were recorded; 505
were diagnosed as having SARS. Of the remaining 3,107
contacts, 2,805 (90%) had a telephone number available,
as reported by the primary patient. We successfully con-
tacted 2,337 (83%) from October 23 to November 30,
2003, and 1,776 (57% of those eligible) consented to a
telephone interview after the purpose of the study was
explained to them by trained public health nurses. The
interview consisted of questions that assessed the relation-
ship between the patients and contacts; the timing, intensi-
ty and frequency of contact; precautionary measures
adopted during contact with the patient; known contact
with other SARS patients; clinical symptoms of febrile,
respiratory, gastrointestinal, or constitutional illness since
February 2003; medical and travel history; and sociode-
mographic details. Participants were then invited to pro-
vide blood samples for serologic testing. Shopping
coupons (worth U.S. $25.00) were given to participants
after blood was collected as compensation for time and
travel costs.
Samples were screened by the Government Virus Unit
of the Department of Health by using viral lysate enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) (GBI Biotech,
Beijing). Positive results were confirmed with immunoflu-
orescence assay (IFA) and neutralization tests. For the IFA,
microscopic slides coated with SARS-CoV–infected
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twofold dilutions starting from1:25. A positive test is indi-
cated by cytoplasmic fluorescence under UV microscopy.
By using IFA as the standard, the ELISA detects antibody
with IFA titer of >25 (i.e., sensitivity of 100%) and has a
specificity of 95%. Neutralization test was performed by
standard virologic method with Vero E6 cells and SARS-
CoV isolate 6109. A titer of >10 was considered positive.
The reported sensitivity of 100% was for convalescent-
phase serum samples taken a few weeks after the onset of
infection in SARS patients, which should apply to our
study. During the early phase of infection, IgM predomi-
nates; the ELISA kit we used detects IgG only. Therefore,
the sensitivity is 80%–90% (depending on the number of
days after illness onset when the serum samples were
taken). However, this sensitivity should not have affected
our findings, which were based on tests carried out at least
6 months after the last reported case of SARS in Hong
Kong. The study received ethics approval from the
Department of Health Ethics Committee, which complies
with the Declaration of Helsinki. 
Results and Conclusions
Of the 1,068 samples analyzed, 2 (0.19%, exact 95% CI
0.02%–0.67%) had a positive titer (1:25 to 1:50 on IFA
compared to at least 1:100 in most recovered SARS cases)
for SARS-CoV IgG antibody. Neither participant with a
positive sample reported a chronic medical condition or
being sick with febrile or respiratory illness from February
to August. Both seropositive participants arose from two
superspreading events in Hong Kong, i.e., Prince of Wales
Hospital nosocomial outbreak and Amoy Gardens environ-
mental point source community outbreak (1,3). The con-
tact of the Prince of Wales Hospital seropositive
participant reported one other close contact, who was
interviewed but declined to be tested. The other seroposi-
tive index patient living in Amoy Gardens was separately
identified by three intrafamilial index patients, all of whom
lived in the same household and reported only each other
as close contacts. The participants who consented to test-
ing were broadly similar to those who declined, except that
the first group had relatively fewer children and fewer of
the first group were men (Table). However, those who
declined testing were more likely to report more frequent
contact and closer relationships with SARS patients, more
febrile or respiratory illness episodes since February, and a
travel history to SARS-affected regions, which may have
biased our seroprevalence estimate upwards.
The extent of seroconversion in close contacts of con-
firmed patients should provide the upper limit of SARS-
CoV antibody seroprevalence in the general population,
given the relatively intense exposure history of these per-
sons to SARS patients. Our finding of the near absence of
transmission resulting in asymptomatic infection in this
representative high-risk group of close contacts indicates
that the prevailing SARS-CoV strains in Hong Kong
almost always led to clinically apparent disease. Whereas
some SARS patients, especially healthcare workers, might
have been initially admitted to reduce transmission to fam-
ily members, virtually all SARS patients (perhaps with
very few exceptions in children [4]) had severe disease
requiring inpatient treatment; thus, we can infer that infec-
tion with SARS-CoV inevitably caused severe disease
requiring hospitalization. 
Although our results suggest that SARS-CoV was a
new virus in humans without a close precursor or an anti-
genically related virus that would have induced at least a
small degree of cross-reactivity on serologic testing, a
recent study on a select group of 938 healthy Hong Kong
adults, whose serum had been previously stored as part of
a hepatitis B serosurvey in 2001, indicated that 1.8% of the
sample had acquired a SARS-CoV–related virus infection
at least 2 years before the 2003 SARS outbreak (5). The
investigators speculated that the virus that affected these
healthy, seropositive persons was antigenically closer to
the recently isolated animal SARS-CoV–like virus (3) than
human SARS-CoV, but interspecies transmission from ani-
mals to humans was probably inefficient, as the virus
might not have adapted in the new host. This hypothesis
would explain why only a few persons became infected
and why they were likely to have been asymptomatic. This
hypothesis would be compatible with the presumed
asymptomatic infection observed in Guangdong animal
traders, especially in those who handled masked palm
civets, who had a seropositivity rate of 72.7% (exact 95%
CI 49.8%–89.3%) in the absence of prior overt clinical dis-
ease (6). 
The limitations of the study include incomplete contact
tracing, especially in the earlier parts of the epidemic, and
potential recall bias from underreporting of contacts by
some patients who were too sick to answer questions.
Another possible shortcoming is the lack of a survey of
close contacts who did not report a telephone number,
although there is no reason to suspect they had a systemat-
ically different serologic profile. In fact, these were most-
ly nonhousehold contacts who would have had less intense
exposure to SARS patients. In addition, because peak
infectivity, as indicated by viral load, usually occurred dur-
ing week 2 of illness (7), when most of the patients would
have been isolated in hospital (the mean onset-to-admis-
sion interval decreased from a maximum of 9.3 days in late
February to 1.0 day by mid-May) (8), transmission to close
contacts in the later stages of the epidemic was less likely.
Finally, contacts who refused to participate (561) or
refused to have serologic testing (708) might have done so
because they were concerned about having had SARS
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and did not want to be identified and stigmatized as having
been infected with SARS-CoV. Surveys in other countries
with large-scale outbreaks such as Canada, China,
Singapore, and Taiwan should be undertaken to confirm
our findings. 
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Table. Characteristics of close contacts recalled for serologic testing (N = 1,776) 
Characteristic 
Tested for IgG against  
SARS-CoV, n = 1,068 (%) 
Declined antibody testing, 
n = 708 (%)  p value 
Age (y)       0.001 
10  53 (5.0)  126 (18.1)   
11–17  77 (7.2)  68 (9.7)   
18–44  515 (48.3)  278 (39.8)   
45–64  330 (30.9)  138 (19.8)   
!65  92 (8.6)  88 (12.6)   
Sex     0.02 
Female  579 (54.2)  341 (48.3)   
Male  489 (45.8)  365 (51.7)   
Travel history to SARS-affected areas since 
February, 2003
a 
    0.001 
Yes  523 (49.0)  268 (37.9)   
No  545 (51.0)  440 (62.1)   
Relationship with SARS case      0.001 
Household family member  789 (74.4)  499 (70.5)   
Non-household family member or relative  230 (21.7)  164 (23.2)   
Friend/classmate/colleague  25 (2.4)  12 (1.7)   
Other (e.g., domestic helper)  16 (1.5)  33 (4.7)   
Frequency of contact with SARS patient within 10 
days of hospital admission 
   0.06 
Daily  666 (62.6)  405 (57.9)   
4–6 days per week  82 (7.7)  56 (8.0)   
1–3 days per week  161 (15.1)  103 (14.7)   
Very occasionally  155 (14.6)  135 (19.3)   
No. of precautions adopted during SARS 
outbreak
b 
   0.25 
2  60 (6.6)  47 (8.6)   
3–4  113 (12.4)  81 (14.8)   
5–6  334 (36.7)  187 (34.1)   
7–8  402 (44.2)  234 (42.6)   
No. of febrile or respiratory illness episodes since 
February 2003 
   0.02 
0  643 (61.7)  471 (68.4)   
1–2  351 (33.7)  193 (28.0)   
!3  48 (4.6)  25 (3.6)   
Presence of chronic medical conditions      0.10 
Yes  270 (28.3)  149 (24.6)   
No  683 (71.7)  457 (75.4)   
Self-perceived health status in previous week      0.34 
Excellent  124 (11.6)  84 (12.0)   
Very good  317 (29.7)  222 (31.8)   
Good  323 (30.3)  223 (31.9)   
Fair  279 (26.1)  152 (21.7)   
Poor  24 (2.2)  18 (2.6)   
aIncludes Canada, China, Singapore, and Taiwan. 
bIncludes washing hands before touching mouth, eyes, and nose; washing hands with soap; wearing face mask; using serving utensils during meals; 
adopting precautionary measures when touching possibly contaminated objects, washing hands after touching possibly contaminated objects; adopting 
home preventive measures (such as maintaining good ventilation and using bleach to clean surfaces and home appliances) against SARS; and adopting 
workplace preventive measures (such as maintaining good ventilation, using bleach to clean surfaces and office furniture, and not allowing staff who are 
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